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1. Introduction 
 
Steel matters.  As a material, it is critical to the infrastructure of economic 
development and the consumer durables and capital goods that fuel that 
development. As an industry, nations have used steel manufacturing as an 
instrument of economic, social, and regional policies. As an industrial base for 
regional economies, the steel industry has helped to define the character and 
identity of great cities.  By examining critical periods of restructuring in this 
industry, the role of economic geography as a competitive factor is readily 
exposed. Moreover, the consequences of industry restructuring play out 
dramatically in terms of the well being of regions. Whether examining the 
competitive factors linked to location or their consequences for regions, an 
important basis for explanation is to be found in steelmaking technology and 
related costs.  The analysis offered in this chapter links technology-based 
competition, demand patterns, and managerial agency to describe and 
explain the process of restructuring in the American and global steel 
industries in terms of their economic geography. 
 
Our analysis begins with a very brief explanation about how steel is made in 
order to help focus attention on some basic locational factors in the industry 
and provide a basis for explaining the relationship between alternative 
technologies and competition among steel firms.  With this understanding, our 
analysis is framed by reference to long trends in industry restructuring as they 
play out for the geography of production in the United States. Subsequent 
sections of the chapter address the consequences of restructuring in terms of 
its spatial and regional dimensions. Our thesis is that technology-based 
competition, demand patterns, and managerial agency have been the primary 
drivers of the steel industry’s fundamental restructuring. There are two related 
parts to our story: First, in Sections 2-6, we describe the transformation of the 
American steel industry in terms of the shift from the dominance of integrated 
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steel to that of minimills. This shift in industry dominance was accompanied 
by a geographical shift away from the historical core of steel production in the 
Midwest to new locations closer to the growing markets of the South and 
Southwest. We argue that this dual shift was driven by an interlinked set of 
drivers, with technology-enabled changes in competition and the geographic 
displacement of demand being primary. The technology effects manifested 
themselves via two distinct pathways: changes in cost structure brought about 
by scrap-based steel production, and impact on competition between 
minimills and integrated producers. However, the visible hand of managerial 
agency (Chandler 1993) also played a role, in that decisions and investments 
by minimill managers - as well as by their counterparts in the integrated mills - 
served to hasten the shift.  
 
Next, in Sections 7-9, we describe the transformation of the global steel 
industry – still under way - in terms of the shift in production and demand from 
the Triad regions (North America, Europe and Japan) to the rest of the world, 
and the rise of the steel multinational corporation (MNC) mainly through 
mergers and acquisitions (M&A) deals. This shift, in turn, was driven by the 
same set of three factors, prime among them being changes in demand 
patterns (manifested in the rise of China) and managerial innovation 
facilitated by new information technologies. The technology driver in this 
instance was not a production technology, but rather advanced information 
systems that greatly increased the geographical distance over which steel 
enterprises could be effectively managed. Managerial agency was manifested 
this time in aggressive growth-seeking by steel firm managers, as they 
engaged in global M&A and other expansion efforts, in many cases newly 
energized by worldwide liberalization and privatization trends. Thus, the 
dramatic restructuring of the steel industry in the United States and globally 
can be interpreted through the lens of technology-based competition, demand 
patterns, and managerial agency. 
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2. Making steel 
 
In many parts of the world, and certainly in the popular image, steelmaking is 
defined by massive plant complexes that process material, beginning with 
iron ore, into semi-finished steel products that are sold to other manufacturers 
or service centers for further processing. This image is true for part of the 
industry, but a competing recycling technology also helps to define the 
modern steel industry – especially in United States, where more than one-half 
of all manufactured steel results from recycling ferrous scrap. 
 
The concept of vertical integration in the steel industry was pioneered by 
Andrew Carnegie in the late nineteenth century.  In 1890, the Carnegie Steel 
Company already included substantial holdings in coal, the primary energy 
source of steelmaking at that time, and Carnegie began to move, slowly at 
first, to acquire interests in the other key raw material – iron ore (Wall 1989, p. 
587). By the end of that century, Carnegie Steel also tied materials acquisition 
to manufacturing with its own extensive railroad interests (Wall 1989, p. 623). 
 
Today, the concept of an “integrated” steel company no longer relates to 
complete ownership in materials, transportation, and manufacturing, as it did 
for Carnegie.  However, the fundamental process of integrated steelmaking 
remains largely unchanged in the sense that mill complexes include materials 
processing, iron making, and steelmaking. Figure 1 shows a simple 
schematic of the integrated steelmaking process.  The actual conversion of 
iron ore takes place in a “blast furnace” that uses coke as a reduction agent 
and basic source of energy. The ore used in the blast furnace takes one of 
two forms: (1) pellets that are produced near the iron mine or (2) “sinter” 
produced at the steel mill by heating finely crushed iron ore along with coke 
powder and limestone (Hall 1997, p. 4-5). However, iron pellets are by far the 
largest form of iron used today in integrated mills (USGS 1998). Blast 
furnaces are closed pressurized vessels that are designed to run continuously 
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for years at time.  Depending on its design, the capacity of a blast furnace 
may be 1.5 million or more than 3 million tons per year, and scale economies 
in such furnaces are critically important. The crude “pig iron” produced in this 
process is transferred in molten form to the integrated mill’s steelmaking 
operations, where carbon levels are reduced in a Basic Oxygen Furnace or 
“BOF”.  In turn, while still in molten form, steel is moved in ladles from the 
BOF to “secondary” steelmaking facilities where steel chemistries and carbon 
content can be tightly controlled for specific end uses. Steel takes its first solid 
form in continuous casting operations, where the cast product is committed to 
flat shapes (slabs used to make steel sheet or plates) or long shapes (billets 
or blooms, which have cross sections that are more nearly square or round). 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
The contrast between an integrated steel process and the alternative steel 
recycling process, which relies on the electric arc furnace (EAF), is dramatic, 
both in terms of complexity and, typically, the scale of operations. As shown 
in Figure 2, this alternative technology is much more direct.  EAFs use post-
consumer scrap metal such as old automobiles and appliances and scrap 
metal cast off in the manufacturing of steel products of many kinds. By 
melting the scrap metal from such sources, EAF producers recover steel that 
can be used to compete directly with ore-based mills. 
 
[Figure 2 here] 
 
The growth of electric furnace steelmaking in North America began to 
increase dramatically in the 1970’s, and this was coincident with very 
important efficiency gains in this technology.  See Barnett and Crandall (1986, 
56-57). The price of scrap metal was very low at that time, and it gave scrap-
based producers a significant cost advantage in certain product lines.  In the 
decades to follow, the scale of many electric furnaces in terms of annual 
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capacities increased to over one million tons, which approaches the low-end 
of the capacity range of integrated steelmaking. Moreover, as experience has 
increased with electric furnaces and technologies have advanced, it has 
become common for the furnace “charge” or input mix to include directly 
reduced iron (DRI) or pig iron. Input substitution between ferrous scrap and 
DRI or pig iron has greatly increased the product range of EAF producers by 
allowing them to more closely control the level of impurities in the scrap-
based steels they produce.  
 
3. Long trends in industry restructuring 
 
Perspective on developments in steel technologies, like the advancement of 
electric furnace steel production, and the competitive forces that they help to 
shape can be gained by reference to long trends in the economic geography 
of American steel production.  The historical geographic core of steel 
production in the United States is defined by three state-based districts: (1) 
Pennsylvania, including, of course, Pittsburgh, where integrated steelmaking 
began in the United States, (2) Illinois-Indiana, where Chicago-Gary is, by far, 
the largest production center, and (3) Ohio, especially areas bordering the 
Great Lakes near Cleveland.  The overriding core-periphery trend in 
American steel production is unambiguous: Table 1 shows that the historical 
core region’s share of total steel production has declined monotonically for 
many decades, as population and overall American manufacturing activity 
shifted southward and westward. However, while this trend in steel production 
is evident, the factors underlying it have evolved in terms of technology and 
the nature of competition.  
 
In the years immediately after World War II, explanation for the historical core 
region’s declining share meant, in practical terms, explaining why 
Pennsylvania, and Pittsburgh in particular, was losing its share of national 
steel production.  As indicated in Table 1, from 1940 to 1970 the historical 
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core region’s share of steel production declined from 72 percent to 62 
percent, with Pennsylvania accounting for seven points of the ten-point 
decline over this thirty-year period. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
 
Pittsburgh’s early advantage in American steelmaking in the middle- to late-
19th Century was found in its proximity to Western Pennsylvania’s coal 
resources as well as the market position that Pittsburgh enjoyed when 
railroad systems began to move westward. Pittsburgh’s distance from the 
source of the other great transferrable resource needed in steel production – 
iron ore – was of little disadvantage when integrated steelmaking began. 
North American iron ore travels primarily by boat or barge from mining areas 
in Michigan and Minnesota, and the transportation cost differentials related to 
iron ore simply did not offset the enormous advantage that Pittsburgh enjoyed 
by its proximity to metallurgical coking coal (Pittsburgh Regional Planning 
Association 1963, p. 262). The other major steel producing regions at the time 
in Ohio and Illinois-Indiana – all located on the Great Lakes – had superior 
water access to iron ore, but suffered relative to Pittsburgh in their proximity 
to sources of coking coal.  
 
Based on this historical advantage, explanations for Pennsylvania’s relative 
decline focused on two sources: (a) changes in technology that reduced 
locational cost advantage in Eastern production centers, and (b) changes in 
the spatial distribution of the market.  Isard and Capron (1948) explain the 
cost side by very substantial progress in fuel efficiencies that reduced the 
amount of coke required in blast furnaces to produce pig iron. This weakened 
the advantage of production centers, like Pittsburgh, that are located close to 
sources of coking coal.  See, also, Pittsburgh Regional Planning Association 
(1963, p. 273).  The market disadvantage of production centers in 
Pennsylvania and other Eastern regions also is recognized as an important 
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locational consideration by Isard and Capron (1948, p. 126) and by Pittsburgh 
Regional Planning Association (1963, p. 278).  Later, Hekman (1978) argues 
that changes in the geographic distribution of the market are the most 
important basis for explaining changes in the distribution of steel production 
among regions. 
 
An argument also can be made that the effect of market growth on steel plant 
capacities in the Midwest was enhanced by the weakening and ultimate 
demise of basing-point pricing in the steel industry.  Under basing-point 
pricing, steel customers pay the F.O.B price at a given steel plant plus 
transportation costs from a pre-determined geographic basing point to the 
customer’s plant location. Pittsburgh pricing, which prevailed until an F.T.C. 
ruling in 1924, set the transport costs on the basis of the customer’s distance 
from Pittsburgh – regardless of where the steel was actually produced. After 
that date the number of basing points used by the industry expanded to 
include Chicago and other cities (Rogers 2009, p. 66), but the practice was 
not entirely eliminated until 1948 (Marengo 1955, p. 509). The ability of 
Pittsburgh mills to compete in markets located at the periphery of its market 
region was eroded when other cities were included in the multiple basing-
point system.  As the system was eliminated those other cities also lost the 
implicit market protection offered by this system.  Consequently, the 
competitive position of steel plants located in distant regions was enhanced in 
geographic markets adjacent to their operations because of lower 
transportation costs, and the lower cost of delivered steel in these markets 
facilitated growth in steel consuming operations. 
 
While these geographic shifts were taking place after World War II, major 
investment decisions were undertaken by steel makers in the United States 
and abroad that would profoundly affect the competitive balance among firms 
in years to come.  The Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) – which is today 
standard technology – emerged in the 1950s to compete with the dominant 
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technology of that time, the Open Hearth (OH) furnace.  Major expansions in 
steelmaking capacity were made in the United States, Europe, and Japan in 
the immediate post-war period. Throughout the 1950s, investments in new 
capacity in the United States were being made in OH furnaces – over thirty-
nine million net tons of OH capacity were added during that decade out of a 
total U.S. capacity of 139 million tons (Hall 1997, p. 40). In contrast, European 
and Japanese steel makers invested in the emerging technology, BOF. A 
decade later, it was apparent that the BOF was superior, and OH furnaces 
began to be phased out of production worldwide. 
 
Many factors, including investments in OH furnaces, combined during the 
1950’s and the 1960’s to weaken the competiveness of integrated steel 
makers in the United States, and this long saga is well documented 
elsewhere. See, for example, Tiffany (1988).  Among these factors, labor 
issues were very important. In effect, the large integrated steel firms 
purchased labor peace at a very high price in the sense that negotiated labor 
settlements built-in substantial cost disadvantages based on hourly rates, 
work rules, and retirement benefits (Hoerr 1988, 77-81; Hall 1997, 45-49).  
“Big steel” emerged from all of this as being especially vulnerable to 
competition from foreign producers, and in 1960, the United States – still a 
major world producer – became a net importer of raw steel.  In addition, 
anemic growth in steel demand after World War II along with the maturation 
of infrastructure investment in the United States limited the opportunity to 
build new plants embodying new technology, without the closure of existing 
integrated mills. See Barnett and Crandall (1986, p. 97) for documentation 
concerning steel demand during this period. 
 
Ironically, the replacement of OH furnaces with BOF’s also helped to spur the 
growth of a new set of domestic competitors for U.S. integrated steel 
producers. The OH technology, which accounted for the largest share of steel 
production in the United States through the 1960s, could accept up to fifty 
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percent ferrous scrap in the furnace charge. While superior in other ways, 
BOF’s by comparison could accept only much smaller amounts of scrap 
metal, and relied much more heavily on the pig iron generated by blast 
furnaces. Thus, replacement of OH furnaces by BOF’s in the 1960’s drove 
down the market price of ferrous scrap.  Small, independent steel producers 
emerged in the United States to take advantage of low scrap prices by using 
EAF technology, and these American “minimills” would reshape the economic 
geography of steel production in North America. 
 
Also in the 1950’s, concern by integrated steel firms with the depletion of 
high-grade iron ore deposits stimulated major investments that further tied 
integrated firms to ore-based technologies.  Costly investments were made in 
“pelletizing” operations that could bring low-grade ores up to the high iron 
content levels necessary for steelmaking.  In addition, integrated firms 
invested heavily to secure access to high-grade ores, especially in Canada 
and South America (Hall 1997, p. 39). As a consequence of these locationally 
fixed investments integrated firms were less able to respond to opportunities 
presented by emerging scrap-based furnace production.  
 
In addition to the technological and economic factors discussed so far, 
managerial factors also played a key role. Christensen (2000) has provided 
rich analysis of key managerial factors that may have differentiated between 
minimills and integrated producers in terms of their response to EAF 
technology. In Christensen’s (2000) account, EAF technology was a 
“disruptive technology” – one key characteristic of which is that, at its 
inception, it is markedly inferior to prevailing technologies. In the case of EAF 
steelmaking, as indicated earlier, it was initially hard to control the chemical 
qualities of the steel produced, because the scrap that went into the furnace 
often varied in its metallurgical composition. Thus, the only markets open to 
EAF products were low-end applications, such as construction re-bar. In 
contrast, more demanding applications such as automotive steel required 
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more precise control of chemical qualities. Focusing on their high-value 
added customers, integrated producers chose to cede the lower-end markets 
to minimills employing EAF technology. Given their lower cost structure, 
minimill companies were able to serve even the lower end markets profitably.  
 
However, a crucial characteristic of disruptive technology is that it gets better 
over time (Christensen, 2000). Bolstered by their profits, and incentivized by 
the prospect of moving upmarket, minimills like Nucor and Chaparral worked 
hard to improve steel quality, as well as invested in the equipment to make 
larger shapes. By the mid-1980s, they had captured not only the entire rebar 
market, but also the lion’s share of the market for bars, rods and angles. 
Once again, constrained by their cost disadvantages and by the preferences 
of their existing customers, integrated producers retrenched from those 
markets, now reduced to flat steel products that demanded the highest levels 
of purity, Christensen’s (2000) analysis brings to light the process through 
which rational managerial decisions in response to real technological, 
economic and customer pressures led to the ascendancy of the minimill.  
 
4. Technology-based competition and industry restructuring 
 
The profound effect of the minimill phenomenon on the economic geography 
of American steel manufacturing is revealed by reference to the long trends 
shown in Table 1. In the thirty-year period from 1970 to 2000, the historical 
core region’s share of national steel production declined by a further 10 
percentage points, just as it had in the previous thirty-year period. In the more 
recent period, however, integrated steel makers were challenged by 
competitors on two fronts, domestic and foreign, and Pennsylvania’s declining 
share shows the consequences. By the end of the 20th Century, a steel era 
had ended, as Pennsylvania’s share of national steel production declined 
from 23 percent to seven percent, and at the same time, rough parity in 
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regional shares between the historical core and other regions made moot the 
very concept of core-periphery distinctions. 
 
The ascendance of EAF technology is evident in Table 2, which shows 
average annual steel production in the United States by furnace type for 
recent decades. EAF steel production doubled from the decade of the 1960s 
to the 1970s, and has continued a trajectory of steady growth to the present 
day – now accounting for well over fifty percent of raw steel production in the 
United States.  Open Hearth (OH) technology – which was the focus of 
immediate post-war investments by US integrated steel producers – was 
phased out rapidly and replaced by BOF technology in the 1960s and 1970s. 
By the 1980s, OH furnaces were clearly obsolete.   Perhaps the most 
dramatic change revealed by Table 2 is the major decline observed in total 
steel production from the 1970s to the 1980s – all of which is accounted for 
by integrated steel firms. 
 
[Table 2 here] 
 
The restructuring in the steel industry that is implied by these data – decline 
by ore-based integrated firms and growth by scrap-based EAF firms – has 
had a profound effect on the economic geography of steel production in the 
United States. The 1981-1982 economic recession experienced in the United 
States triggered a series of major plant closures and capacity adjustments 
that reflected long-term strategic decisions by integrated steelmakers.  In 
1974 forty-five ore-based plants produced non-specialty steel in the United 
States, and by 1991, ore-based capacity had been eliminated in twenty-two of 
these plants (Beeson and Giarratani 1998, p. 425).  Most of the plants 
involved were permanently closed; four remained open, but only with EAF 
capacity.    Mirroring the production data presented in Table 2, the capacity of 
ore-based steel plants in the United States also has dropped very 
substantially in recent periods.  From 1974 to 1991, total ore-based furnace 
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capacity in the United States decreased from 140.5 million tons per year to 76 
million tons per year, a decline of 45.9 percent (Beeson and Giarratani 1998, 
p. 435). 
 
Figure 3 shows the way that these reductions played out in terms of the 
spatial distribution of ore-based steelmaking capacity in United States by 
focusing on total BOF capacity in state-based regions during the 1970s, 
1980s, and 1990s.  Sharp declines in northeastern regions (Region 4 and 
Region 10) and in the West (Region 9) contrast vividly with relatively stable 
capacity in other places, especially in the upper Midwest (Region 1, Region 2, 
and Region 3).  
 
[Figure 3 here.] 
 
The observed geographic patterns of ore-based capacity change are best 
understood in terms of a partitioning of the product markets for steel. As 
explained by Ahlbrandt, Fruehan and Giarratani (1996) in the process of 
restructuring, ore-based integrated producers largely focused the capacity of 
their plants toward flat products (steel slabs) and eliminated their capacities to 
produce long products (steel billets and blooms).   At the time of this 
partitioning, with a very small number of exceptions, the product range of EAF 
plants was limited to the billets and blooms necessary to fashion products like 
construction beams, steel rods, and reinforcement bars.   The cost advantage 
of EAF producers forced ore-based integrated producers out of these 
markets, except in circumstances where the ore-based firm produced bars or 
other long products with special characteristics in term of hardness or other 
attributes that were beyond the metallurgical range of EAF mills.  Also recall 
the previous discussion of EAF technology as a “disruptive” force 
(Christensen 2000) that triggered managerial responses eventually leading to 
such partitioning. See Barnett and Crandall (1986) as well for corroborative 
detail.  Inter-firm competition is not static, however, and the relentless 
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incursion of EAF producers into the markets served by integrated firms 
continues to the present day. 
 
The location of automobile plants and auto parts suppliers was an important 
consideration in restructuring by integrated steelmakers.  In the 1980’s, EAF 
producers had limited or no access to the markets for automotive steel, and 
BOF producers made capacity decisions accordingly. Plant locations in 
Illinois-Indiana and Ohio served the strategic needs of integrated producers 
and the evidence for this is clear in Figure 3.  The very dramatic declines in 
BOF capacities in Pennsylvania and other states are a consequence of exit 
by integrated firms from the markets for long products, and growth or stability 
in BOF capacities elsewhere are a consequence of the focus by integrated 
firms on the markets for flat products – especially, steel sheet that is shipped 
in coils to manufacture automobiles and other goods (Beeson and Giarratani 
1998). 
 
5. Steel minimills and industry restructuring 
 
While transport costs on materials and finished products are important in 
determining the profitability of steel minimills in the same way that these 
factors are important to integrated mills, the basic transferrable input used by 
minimills – ferrous scrap – is much more widely distributed than the iron ore 
and coking coal required by integrated mills. This suggests that regions where 
ferrous scrap is in surplus would be especially attractive minimill locations, 
given the proximity of a plant location to product markets. It also suggests that 
transportation infrastructure – rail networks and barge access for scrap, 
trucking for finished steel – will be important factors in plant location. 
Substantial electricity is required for scrap-based steel production, and the 
price of electricity also is a key locational factor.  
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Figure 4 shows the capacity of scrap-based steel production (EAF producers) 
in state-based regions during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s. In sharp contrast 
to the pattern observed for ore-based steel production (BOF producers), 
scrap-based plant capacity is widely dispersed and steady or growing in most 
regions.  Very substantial decade-to-decade growth is found several regions, 
and especially in the southern and southeastern states. See Region 7 and 
Region 8. 
 
[Figure 4 here.] 
 
The contrast in locational patterns for ore-based and scrap-based producers 
is displayed vividly in Figure 5, which maps specific plant locations for each 
technology in 2003. 
 
[Figure 5 here.] 
 
One remarkable implication of EAF capacity growth is that it has changed the 
very concept of a “steel” region in the United States.  For most readers, the 
fact that the northeast corner of Arkansas, a very rural state, is home to one 
of the largest steel producing counties in the United States would come as a 
great surprise. Yet, this location along the Mississippi River can claim two 
large scrap-based EAF steel mills and has a total steelmaking capacity that is 
greater than the current steelmaking capacity in all of Pennsylvania. 
Moreover, the plant capacity in Arkansas was built on two green field sites 
with one start-up in 1987, Nucor-Yamato Steel Company in Blytheville AR, 
and a second start-up in 1992, Nucor Steel’s facility in Hickman AR. In order 
to understand this phenomenon fully, it is important to appreciate the process 
by which scrap-based EAF producers emerged as formidable competitors 
with ore-based integrated mills. 
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Although electric furnace steel production has a much longer history, the 
beginning of the market insurgence by steel minimills in the United States can 
be dated to late 1950s and early 1960s when a small number of firms used 
the cost advantages they enjoyed from scrap-based manufacturing to 
produce reinforcement bars for concrete used in the construction industry 
(Hall 1997, p. 154-157).  The plants involved were often at the periphery of 
market areas served by integrated steel producers and were buffered from 
competition by advantage in transportation costs (Barnett and Crandall 1886, 
p. 19). In these locations, minimills enjoyed very significant advantage in 
production cost: ferrous scrap was abundant, easily accessible, and available 
at low prices; EAF mills had very low capital costs relative to integrated mills; 
and electricity costs were low (Ahlbrandt, Fruehan, and Giarratani 1996) in 
the peripheral locations.  These advantages, most particularly low capital 
costs, allowed minimills to exploit highly local markets for steel products in 
small scale plants. 
 
The most formidable challenges to ore-based producers began in the latter 
part of the 1960s and the 1970s, when minimill producers began taking 
advantage of their success by reinvesting profits to replicate successful mills 
within a multi-plant firm structure.  Florida Steel Corporation began this 
pattern, while retaining its focus on producing steel products for local 
construction markets (Hall 1997, p. 158-159). Nucor Steel was among the 
market entrants that followed the multi-plant pattern, but along with several 
other minimill producers, Nucor began to scale up plant capacities, extend its 
product range beyond construction steels, and serve much wider market 
areas (Barnett and Crandall 1986, p. 19).  Expansion in scale, product range, 
and geographic markets placed EAF producers like Nucor in direct 
competition with integrated firms, and continuously improving EAF 
technologies added to the advantage of these insurgent firms over time.  
Beeson and Giarratani (1998) provide statistical evidence linking reductions in 
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ore-based capacities across space and the closure of integrated plant directly 
to this minimill challenge.  
 
The transformation of minimills from small scale plants serving local markets 
to larger scale plants serving broad markets explains the patterns observed in 
Figure 4, and is plainly evident in Table 3, which documents the size 
distribution of minimills in 1978 and 2003. Over this period, the number of 
minimills increased by nearly fifty percent and total minimill capacity tripled.  
Median plant capacity ratchets up from 350 thousand tons per year in 1978 to 
750 thousand tons per year in 2003, and average plant capacity begins to 
approach one million tons by the end of the period. Indeed, in 2003, nearly 
one-third of existing “minimills” have an annual capacity of one million or more 
tons. 
 
[Table 3 here.] 
 
6. Minimill cost advantage 
 
An important part of the cost advantage enjoyed by minimills was their early 
adoption of continuous casting technology.  In most modern mills, steel takes 
its first solid form only as it passes from secondary steelmaking operations in 
a mill through a continuous caster.  The earlier technology required pouring 
molten steel into casts to create “ingots” that could be placed in inventory for 
later use.  Transforming ingots into billets, blooms, or slabs required re-
melting before further processing in separate rolling mills. The costs of capital 
and energy required for ingot casting and re-melting are very substantial, and 
continuous casting is much more cost effective.  
 
Scrap-based minimills began adopting continuous casting in the early 1960s, 
and the technology quickly became standard for minimills as EAF capacity 
expanded. By comparison, integrated mills adopted the technology only with 
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a very substantial time lag, due, in part, to the challenges imposed by casting 
slabs at large volume (Warren 2001, p. 256). Further, integrated producers 
may have experienced “lock-in” effects from the geometry of their prior 
commitments: e.g., at its Mon Valley plant, US Steel was constrained by the 
need to work with a furnace and a rolling mill situated ten miles apart – a 
configuration consistent with existing casting technology (Ghemawat 1997). 
The net result of this difference in adoption rates was a direct cost savings for 
minimills that may have approached $40-$50 per ton of steel (Rogers 2009, 
p. 132).  
 
Beyond this direct cost-savings per ton, continuous casting technology also 
was a linchpin for the introduction of modern manufacturing techniques to the 
American steel industry.  Ahlbrandt, Fruehan, and Giarratani (1996, 89-90) 
explain that by investing simultaneously in continuous casting technology, 
human capital, and human resource practices that encourage the 
decentralization of decision making on the shop floor, steel manufacturers 
were taking advantage of important complementarities that had a tremendous 
impact on productivity. The basis for these gains was laid out clearly by 
Womack, Jones, and Roos (1990). In this widely read book on the automobile 
industry, the authors show how the elimination of inventories in production 
lines enables a process of “lean manufacturing” that provides a basis for 
substantial efficiency gains and quality improvements.  The introduction of 
continuous casting in the steel industry had exactly these effects, and by 
doing so it enhanced the importance of human resource considerations in 
plant location decisions. 
 
The importance of human resources in the link between technology and 
production efficiency is highlighted by the experience of Nucor Steel, which 
has served as a model for many other firms in the way that it ties together 
technology, human resources, and the process of production to enhance its 
competitiveness (Ghemawat 1995, 1997).  The heart of Nucor’s labor model 
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is a pay-for-performance system keyed to quality-based production, but this is 
imbedded in a much larger corporate culture that decentralizes decision 
making and encourages a get-it-done approach to problem solving 
(Ahlbrandt, Fruehan, and Giarratani 1996, 74-78). Nucor is not the only 
steelmaker with these characteristics, but its influence on the industry has 
been very important, and the kind of “high-performance” workplace that Nucor 
and other firms apply can result in substantial productivity gains (Ichniowski, 
Shaw and Prennushi, 1997). 
 
Minimill producers striving to implement Nucor-like work systems place a 
premium on labor flexibility in terms of cross-skilling. For example, most of 
these firms rely on a very limited number of job categories so that workers in 
a given category have and use a number of different skills across a wide 
range of tasks.  On a given day one worker might spend part of the day 
monitoring process controls and another part of the same day in maintenance 
activities.  Because of the emphasis on decentralization in decision making, 
problem solving is valued and encouraged. This labor model encourages 
minimills to seek locations for new plants where workers could be trained in a 
flexible work environment.  While many minimills are non-union and others 
are unionized, the spatial distribution of these producers strongly favors right-
to-work states. 
 
The management of human resources was not the only area in which 
minimills followed sophisticated approaches that enhanced their competitive 
advantage. Staying with the example of Nucor, another key factor was 
efficient management of capital, which was critical in the capital-intensive 
steel industry (Ghemawat 1997). During its period of growth, Nucor 
demonstrated a cadence of building or rebuilding one plant a year, acting as 
its own general contractor in each instance. This approach provided not only 
significant knowledge spillovers in between plant construction and operations, 
but also superior capital efficiency – allowing Nucor to build its first thin-slab 
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caster for an investment estimated to be 25% less than it would have cost 
rivals, and to achieve operating break-even a year and half sooner 
(Ghemawat 1997).   
 
In addition to labor factors, the locational cost advantage of EAF mills 
depends especially on the availability and price of ferrous scrap – the primary 
transferrable input for EAF steel making. Figure 6 shows clearly the cost 
advantage enjoyed by minimills away from the core Northeast and Midwest. 
Along with lower electricity prices – pointed out earlier – this factor further 
reinforced the attractiveness of production locations in what was previously 
the periphery.  
[Figure 6 here.] 
 
A summary of our key arguments is appropriate as we conclude this part of 
the chapter. Over the decades, the regional structure of the American steel 
industry changed drastically as a result of three interacting drivers. The 
evolution of EAF technology changed the relative cost positions of industry 
players, propelling significant growth for mini-mills. Economic growth in the 
South led to new markets for steel in areas away from the traditional industrial 
clusters of the Midwest, and minimills were able to situate themselves closer 
to those markets. Managerial agency intervened in the form of aggressive 
growth-seeking by minimill firms such as Nucor, and a corresponding 
tendency on the part of integrated producers to retrench away from markets 
that were targeted by the minimills. Thus, technology-based competition, 
demand shifts and managerial agency worked jointly to bring about the 
regional shifts we described in the American steel industry. 
 
In order to provide the global context to our story, we now turn to the 
restructuring of the world steel industry. In addition to merely providing 
context, however, we find that the same three drivers may explain the global 
restructuring that is currently under way. Demand shifts away from the Triad 
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markets (US, Japan and the European Community), new information 
technologies that facilitate worldwide managerial coordination, and 
aggressive managers seeking to reconfigure the industry to their own 
advantage – our analysis shows these to be drivers of the steel industry’s 
globalization, much as they were in the case of the American steel industry. 
 
7. The global dispersion of demand 
 
Observers have noted three eras in the history of the global steel industry 
(e.g., Laplace Conseil 2003) – the pre-War national era, the period from the 
Second World War to the 1970s oil crisis, and the period since 1973, which is 
often viewed as culminating in the globalization of the steel industry. Two key 
developments underlying the globalization of the industry were liberalization 
(the freeing of political and strategic restrictions) and the attendant 
privatization of steel companies. Historically, governments around the world 
tended to heavily support their domestic steel producers, reflecting both 
concerns about preserving employment in a sector with powerful labor 
unions, and the entrenched view that the steel industry was “strategic” for 
industrial and military reasons. In the 1980s, 60% of the world’s steelmaking 
capacity was government-owned (Wall Street Journal 2005). Subsequently, 
however, reflecting the zeitgeist of liberalization as well as inability to continue 
to bear the economic costs of inefficient government-owned plants, much of 
this capacity was privatized – bringing government ownership down to 40% of 
capacity by 2005 (Wall Street Journal 2005). In the Triad nations, where 
government ownership was less of a factor, bankruptcy restructuring 
facilitated the shedding of legacy costs, such as pension obligations, leading 
quickly to the emergence of a robust global market for steel assets. 
 
While the large-scale liberation of steel companies from government 
ownership and/or political strictures that kept them domestic was an important 
factor, however, the globalization of the industry is most apparent if we 
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examine changes in the global demand pattern. In 1960, the United States 
accounted for 26% of world steel markets, and the Triad nations  for 56% 
(Old, 1985). Parallel to the “core to periphery” shift noted earlier within the 
American steel industry, the world industry has undergone a massive 
structural shift in terms of the geographic location of steel production. (See 
Figures 7 and 8]. 
 
[Figures 7 and 8 here] 
 
Two observations are worth making here. Figure 7 demonstrates compellingly 
that Asia is now the center of gravity of steel production, accounting for over 
60% of all steel produced. Figure 8 breaks down the Asia numbers even 
further, pinpointing simultaneously, the relatively stable role of Japan, the 
massive growth in China, and the significant room for growth in India. The 
well-known geo-economic shifts that comprise the slowing of growth in the 
Triad and the emergence of growth markets elsewhere (e.g., the BRIC 
nations) are clearly the fundamental drivers of the shift toward regions that 
were hitherto peripheral. In particular, it is useful to note one factor that is 
here to stay: steel intensity declines in the developed world. Crude steel 
consumption has stabilized at 400 kg per capita in the developed world – with 
low population growth and the shift to service-based economies, this steel 
intensity is not expected to increase. In contrast, however, China’s steel 
consumption in 2010 was 450 kg per capita, and rising, driven by huge 
investments in infrastructure. Nor is China’s hunger for steel expected to slow 
down any time soon, as suggested by two yardsticks (BHPBilliton 2012): 
First, China’s car penetration density in 2010 was 32 cars per thousand 
persons, compared to 423 in the United States. Second, China has only 32 
square meters of urban residential floor space per capita, compared to 73 in 
the United States. 
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The second observation is that, important as China is, this is not entirely a 
China story: the rest of the developing world (ex-China) consumed over 400m 
tones of steel in 2010, and the 2000-2010 CAGR was 5.6%. (Arcelor Mittal 
2011). That there is even more room for growth outside China is illustrated by 
comparing steel intensity numbers. India, lagging behind China on 
infrastructure investment and industrialization, consumed 60 kg per capita. 
The comparable number for other developing countries (apart from China and 
India) was 102 kg per capita. With a population base of nearly 5.5 billion, and 
driven by industrialization and urbanization, thus, the emerging markets are 
where the demand and demand growth are expected to be. For a firm-level 
illustration: At Arcelor Mittal, which is the world’s largest steel producer, over 
1/3 of current shipments go to the emerging markets (Arcelor Mittal 2011). 
 
8. The emergence of the steel MNC 
 
Accompanying the demand and production shifts from the Triad nations to the 
emerging markets noted above is the emergence of the steel MNC. Unlike 
similar or related industries such as Aluminum or mining, both of which 
witnessed the emergence of MNCs decades ago, steel companies are 
latecomers to multinational operations. In fact, it was the merger of three 
European national steelmakers to create Arcelor in 2001 that heralded the 
rise of the large-scale MNC in the steel industry.  The adoption of the MNC 
form can be seen as a natural response to the industry dynamics noted 
earlier: The large increased demand in China/ Asia combined with the 
importance of operating on a global scale (global customers and global 
competition) led to the pressure for consolidation in a fragmented industry 
(IBM 2007). Given the powerful economic rationale against creating new 
capacity in many regions of the world, M&A were the primary means of global 
expansion for the established steelmakers. Figures 9 and 10 lay out the 
extent and impact of M&A activity in the global steel industry. 
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[Figures 9 and 10 here] 
 
At its peak in 2006-2007, the steel industry witnessed a total of 323 M&A 
transactions over the two years, with a peak in dollar value of close to US$ 79 
billion in 2006 (Figure 9). Although the number and size of deals has declined 
since then, the pace of consolidation continues. Figure 10 demonstrates that 
the rankings of the top steel producers have been routinely upset by 
consolidation deals. For example, Arcelor became the world’s Number One 
steelmaker in 2001 as a direct result of the merger that created it.  Similarly, 
NKK of Japan climbed from the 8th position in 2002 to 4th (as JFE) upon its 
merger with Kawasaki Steel. The appearance of new Chinese steelmakers on 
the Top Ten list is also directly attributable to M&A transactions. 
  
Figure 10 also reminds us that, despite the considerable consolidation that 
has taken place, the steel industry remains highly fragmented. The total share 
of production accounted for by the Top Ten (i.e., C10) has barely changed 
during this period, in fact declining slightly to 0.24 in 2010 from 0.25 in 2000. 
By way of a rough comparison, the top five iron ore producers accounted for 
over 40% of the iron ore market (PwC 2004).   
 
One important implication of the cross-border M&A phenomenon was that 
foreign ownership of steelmaking assets became reality, a far cry from the 
past preoccupation with domestic ownership of an industry that was widely 
held to be strategic in nature. At one point, it was estimated that foreign 
steelmakers owned 42% of steel capacity in the NAFTA region (Blume, 
2008). 
 
Thus, M&A played a critical role as an instrument of corporate initiative that 
fundamentally reshaped the industry and impelled the emergence of the steel 
MNC. We view the prevalence of M&A in this context as an expression of 
managerial agency that took place in the context of demand shifts, but was 
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distinct from it. A counterexample serves to make this point: Tiffany (1987) 
has noted that US Steel did not pursue the clear opportunity to expand in 
Europe when that continent’s steel plants lay in shambles at the end of the 
First World War. Tiffany (1987) attributes this to a judgment on the part of 
Wall Street financiers, the potential providers of expansion capital, that there 
were greater profits to be made by lending directly to Europeans to rebuild 
their own industry than by supporting US Steel’s expansion. In such a view, 
managerial judgment may have led to the path not taken (of 
internationalization). However, in the late 1990s and then the 2000s, steel 
industry managers arrived at a different conclusion, and that has clearly led to 
a different set of outcomes. 
 
It should also be noted that the M&A transactions did not emerge only from 
established steel companies from the prior core, i.e., developed world 
companies. In fact, arguably, one of the key instigators of the industry 
consolidation wave was a virtual outsider, Laxmi Nivas Mittal, who got his 
start running a small mini-mill in Indonesia (Ghemawat & Madhavan 2011). 
Developed world steelmakers have indeed accounted for many large cross-
border deals. However, steel producers from the emerging markets have also 
been active players – e.g., Tata Steel’s acquisition of Corus in 2007, and 
Gerdau’s transactions in North America. Kumar & Chadha (2009) provide a 
useful comparative analysis of Indian and Chinese outward FDI in the steel 
industry. The trend in domestic M&A is also similarly represented across the 
key nations. In China, for example, the fragmentation of the steel industry, 
with its implications for efficiency and competitiveness, is a matter of great 
concern to policy makers. In 2008, China’s top ten domestic steelmakers 
accounted for 42.5% of total output (i.e., C10 = 42.5). According to the 
Chinese government’s 2005 Development Policies for the Iron and Steel 
Industry, the target C10 for 2020 is over 70 (KPMG 2009).  
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One key aspect of the evolution of the steel industry relates to its interface 
with the mining industry. With the growth in demand for steel inputs such as 
iron ore and coal, as well as the increasing concentration in the mining sector, 
it’s clear that ensuring access to raw materials is a key concern for 
steelmakers. One outcome has been vertical integration: Indeed, much of the 
value that Mittal saw in acquiring post-Soviet steel mills may have been in the 
captive mines that came with the factories rather than in their steelmaking 
capacity Ghemawat (2007). This dialectical dynamic comprising concentrated 
market power on the part of the miners and the search for mineral self-
sufficiency on the part of steelmakers will have interesting results – e.g., more 
direct attempts to buy up mines, such as Arcelor Mittal’s 2011 attempt to gain 
control of Macarthur Coal, and the emergence of “haves” and “have-nots” in 
the steel industry in terms of mineral self-sufficiency (Lichtenstein, 2011) - 
with attendant implications for valuation differentials that may in turn drive 
further merger activity. 
 
In our description of structural changes in the US steel industry, technology 
played a key role – minimills employed scrap-based production technology to 
direct great competitive pressure at integrated producers. Interestingly, 
technology plays a parallel role in the ongoing restructuring of the global steel 
industry, although with an important difference. The US domestic story 
recounted earlier was driven by production technology, i.e., the rise of EAF 
production. In the globalization case, we propose that it was not production 
technology, but rather supporting organizational technologies that mattered – 
specifically, sophisticated information technology tools that triggered 
managerial innovations and in turn facilitated the creation and ongoing 
management of the MNC form. Two examples serve to illustrate: 
ThyssenKrupp’s use of networked computer systems to bring about global 
integration, Arcelor Mittal’s coordination of inter-regional demand patterns 
through advanced information systems. 
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In ThyssenKrupp’s case, we see how high-technology communication tools 
make possible a production chain that is dispersed over three continents 
(Wall Street Journal 2010). ThyssenKrupp is a pioneer in stitching together a 
truly global steel supply chain, with a plant in Sepetiba, Brazil making steel 
slabs, which are then rolled and treated in Alabama for higher-value added 
applications. A small team based in Rotterdam uses networked computer 
systems to coordinate customer orders, slab production, and further 
processing efficiently. ThyssenKrupp sees itself as a “virtual integrated steel 
mill” (Wall Street Journal 2010). Industry accounts suggest that the company 
has been able to create significant efficiencies in production and logistics cost 
by virtue of this networking technology. 
 
In Arcelor Mittal’s case, evidence suggests that significant managerial 
attention and the effective use of information systems (including knowledge 
transfer) have allowed it to leverage its resources globally as well as to 
respond in nuanced ways to regional differences market needs. At the time of 
their merger in 2006, there was a significant difference in technological 
capability between Arcelor and Mittal Steel. While Arcelor and Mittal Steel 
were roughly the same size, Arcelor’s annual R&D outlay was more than 10 
times that of Mittal Steel, with the result that Mittal mills tended to lag their 
Arcelor counterparts in efficiency, reliability, and quality of steel 
(BusinessWeek 2010). When you have a global company that demonstrates 
such stark differences in technology levels, leveraging advanced technology 
from the better units to the other units represents “low hanging fruit,” as 
compared to developing new technology. As evidence, consider how Arcelor 
Mittal’s 2006 Activity Report (Arcelor Mittal 2006) opens its description of 
R&D accomplishments (page 61): “The merger has added a new dimension 
to the R&D effort by widening the range of potential applications for existing 
technical know-how and permitting the better use of this expanded R&D 
resource in order to accelerate project work.” A more graphic explanation of 
the technology transfer process is provided by Business Week (2010): 
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“To tap into that expertise, Burns Harbor recently dispatched a team of 
engineers to Sidmar, Arcelor's crown jewel, in Ghent, Belgium. The idea 
was to figure out why, with the exact same inputs, the Europeans were 
able to squeeze about 7% more steel out of their mills than the U.S. plants 
could. The Americans relished the candlelight dinners in the old quarter of 
Ghent, but they were even more wowed by the advanced technology and 
shop-floor know-how they saw in Belgium. Now, they're gearing up to use 
a Sidmar device called a bomb that can be plunged into molten steel to 
sample its chemical properties and detect imperfections early on. The 
Mittals are pushing for just that sort of knowledge exchange across the 
company's global network, from Brazil to Kazakhstan. The many cultures 
now under the Arcelor Mittal flag provide "an inexhaustible source of 
competitive advantage," says Greg Ludkovsky, the company's chief 
technology officer for the Americas.””  
 
The main point here is that the Arcelor Mittal merger resulted in a much larger 
platform of application sites over which existing technologies could be 
leveraged. In other words, absent the merger, each of these technologies 
would have suffered from a much smaller scope of application, thus reducing 
the return on investment for that particular technology.  
 
A second aspect with regard to technology in the case of Arcelor Mittal is 
represented by the company’s approach to balancing global scale with 
responsiveness to local pressures. One specific instance: Demand and 
product requirements for steel vary across markets, and Arcelor Mittal needed 
to view demand regionally in order to optimize production and customer 
service. However, internal data on approx. 200,000 customers were scattered 
across  30+ systems. With IBM’s help, Arcelor Mittal developed an integrated 
system that provides managers with a unified view of regional patterns in 
demand. (IBM 2010). 
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To summarize the second part of our story, we propose that the geographic 
restructuring of the global steel industry should be understood in terms of the 
rise of steel production and consumption in the emerging markets as well as 
the rise of the steel MNC. The drivers of this fundamental shift, it turns out, 
are the same three drivers we noted earlier in the American industry’s case: 
technology-based competition (although this time with a focus on information 
technology, not steel production techniques), demand shifts, and managerial 
agency. 
 
9. Patterns in the restructuring of the industry. 
 
Before concluding the Chapter, we would like to point out two features of the 
regional restructuring that we have described in the US steel industry and in 
the global industry. The first feature can be summarized as a shift from the 
“Core-Periphery” model to one of “multipolarity.” The second feature can be 
summarized as a regional model of globalization. Below, we briefly discuss 
each in turn. 
 
In both the US domestic industry and at the global level, our analysis 
suggests the relative decline of the hitherto core and the ascendancy of the 
periphery. However, even more fundamentally, the data and trends perhaps 
suggest the irrelevance of the core-periphery model itself. Specifically, what 
we see is not merely a switch in the roles or the emergence of new cores and 
new peripheries, but rather a new structure in which different regions are 
much more equally balanced. Although it might appear that China is the new 
core and all other regions are peripheries, the steel intensity trends noted 
earlier suggest that this is not sustainable beyond the medium term. As 
emerging nations other than China gain speed on their own industrialization 
trajectories, we are likely to see greater balance across the regions. More 
important, assessed through the lens of global reach and strategic capability 
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of its steel companies, it is hard to describe China as the core. As a rough 
illustration, the companies in the list of Top ten steel producers in 2010 (see 
Figure 10) represent China (3 companies), Japan (2 companies) and Europe, 
South Korea, India, United States, and Brazil (1 company each). This raises 
the intriguing possibility that, rather than the core-periphery model, 
multipolarity may be more suitable as a descriptor of the global steel industry 
of the future. 
 
Experience also suggests that the globalization of the steel industry has not 
followed a “flat earth” model, in which patterns of competition are uniform, but 
rather a “semiglobalization” model (Ghemawat 2007) that is much more 
nuanced and complex. Despite the growth of China and importance of steel 
MNCs, steel markets continue to be regional rather than frictionlessly global. 
A significant portion of steel exports consists of regional exports, and a steel 
producer in Germany is more likely to be in direct competition with a rival in 
Poland rather than in Brazil. Ghemawat (2007) points out that regionally 
focused strategies are a discrete family of strategies that need to complement 
local and global initiatives. From the steel industry’s standpoint, this 
exacerbates the organizational complexity associated with global footprints – 
in that strong regional hubs need to be created, with technological and 
managerial support for extensive knowledge-sharing both regionally and inter-
regionally. Policymakers should take note as well – keeping up with the 
industry’s restructuring implies developing new global approaches as well as 
closer regional coordination. 
 
10. Summary and conclusions 
 
In this chapter, we proposed technology-based competition, demand patterns, 
and managerial agency as explanatory variables for the process of 
restructuring in the American steel industry in terms of its economic 
geography and in the context of sweeping changes in the industry’s global 
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structure. After World War II and leading through the 1960’s, the industrial 
structure of the American steel industry was dominated by large integrated 
steel producers. During this period, competition was primarily among 
integrated firms and the location decisions taken during the period concerned 
individual production units within those firms.  Subsequently, in the 1970’s 
and on through the 1990’s, steel minimills emerged in the United States to 
challenge the market share of integrated producers.  Finally, with the turn of 
the century, world steel markets began to reshape based on globalization.  
Energized by industry liberalization and privatization in many parts of the 
world, and supported by information technology and managerial innovations 
that increased spans of control, managerial agency manifested itself in the 
form of aggressive M&A to create the first large-scale steel MNCs. By 
examining these critical periods of restructuring in the American industry as 
well as in the industry globally, the role of economic geography as a 
competitive factor is exposed. In the process, we hope to have provided 
context for understanding the regional and spatial implications of competitive 
adjustment. 
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Figure 1 
Integrated Steelmaking Schematic 
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Figure 2 
Electric Arc Furnace Steelmaking Schematic 
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Table 1 
 
Regional Percentage Shares of U.S. Steel Production, 1940 – 2008 
 
  
 
OH 
 
 
PA 
 
 
IL-IN 
Historical 
Core Region 
Sub-total 
 
All Other 
States 
 
 
Total 
 
1940 21 30 21 72 28 100% 
1950 19 28 20 68 32 100% 
1960 17 24 22 64 36 100% 
1970 16 23 23 62 38 100% 
1980 14 21 26 61 39 100% 
1990 17 12 29 58 42 100% 
2000 16 7 29 52 48 100% 
2008 15 6 29 50 50 100% 
 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute (various years), Annual Statistical Report, 
Washington, D.C., USA: American Iron and Steel Institute. 
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Table 2 
 
Steel Production by Furnace Type: 
Average Annual Production for Each Decade, 1960s - 2000s 
 
(Millions of Net Tons) 
 
  
Open Hearth 
 
Basic Oxygen 
 
Electric Arc 
Total 
(All Furnaces) 
1960-69   82.3* 24.4 13.0 119.7 
1970-79 30.0 76.3 26.3 132.6 
1980-89   6.9 56.0 31.3   94.2 
1990-99   0.5 59.1 41.8 101.4 
2000-08   0.0 49.7 55.7 105.4 
*Note: Includes a small amount of production from Bessemer furnaces, which 
were completely decommissioned in the United States by 1968. 
 
Source: American Iron and Steel Institute (various years), Annual Statistical 
Report, Washington, D.C., USA: American Iron and Steel Institute. 
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Figure 3 
 
Basic Oxygen Furnace (BOF) Capacity in State-based Regions: 
Annual Average Capacity in each Decade, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s 
 
(Millions of Tons) 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Industry Studies, US Steel Plant Database, Pittsburgh, PA, 
USA: University of Pittsburgh. 
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Figure 4 
 
Electric Arc Furnace  (EAF) Capacity in State-based Regions: 
Annual Average Capacity in each Decade, 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s 
 
(Millions of Tons) 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Industry Studies, US Steel Plant Database, Pittsburgh, PA, 
USA: University of Pittsburgh. 
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Figure 5 
 
Location of Steel Plants in the United States, 2003 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Center for Industry Studies, US Steel Plant Database, Pittsburgh, PA, 
USA: University of Pittsburgh. 
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Table 3 
 
Size Distribution of U.S. Steel Minimills  
by Plant Capacity, 1978 and 2003 
 
 
Plant Capacity 
(Thousands of Tons) 
1978 
(Number of  
Minimill Plants) 
2003 
(Number of  
Minimill Plants) 
1,000 or more 3 22 
800 – 999 4 10 
600 – 799 4 15 
400 – 599 9 13 
200 – 399 13 4 
Less than 200 11 1 
   
Total number of minimill 
plants 
44 65 
Total minimill plant capacity 20,293 61,089 
Average minimill plant 
capacity 
461 940 
Median minimill plant 
capacity 
350 750 
 
Source: Center for Industry Studies, US Steel Plant Database, Pittsburgh, PA, 
USA: University of Pittsburgh. 
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Figure 6 
 
Regional Price Differentials Based on the RMDAS™ Ferrous Scrap Price Index: 
Monthly Price for Prompt Industrial Composite, 2006 
 
(Delivered Price – U.S. Weighted Average) 
 
 
 
Source: Management Science Associates’ (MSA) Raw Material Data 
Aggregation Service™ (RMDAS): http://rmdasindex.msa.com/ 
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 Figure 7 
 
The Shift to Asia:  
Crude Steel Production Share Across World Regions 
 
 
Source: World Steel Association 
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Figure 8 
 
The Rise of China: 
Crude Steel Production Share in Key Markets 
 
Source: World Steel Association 
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Figure 9 
 
M&A Deal Activity in the Global Steel Industry 
 
 
 
 
Source: pwc Metal Deals: Forging Ahead, various annual issues 
  
Figure 10 
 
How Megadeals Reshaped Industry Leadership:  
Top 10 Steel Producers (Million Metric Tonnes)  
* indicates a steelmaker that improved its Top 10 standing by means of major 
acquisition(s) in that year 
 
 
Source: World Steel Association 
 
